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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Michael Russo was found guilty of one count of rape, one
count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. He received an aggregate
sentence of fixed life.
On appeal, Mr. Russo asserts two claims of error. First, he contends that the
district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video discovered through a
warrantless, non-consensual search of his phone. Second, he contends that the district
court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence
concerning his deviant sexual interests.
In response, the State argues that no error occurred. The present Reply Brief is
necessary to explain why the State's arguments are without merit.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in
Mr. Russo's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, need not be repeated in toto herein.
However, because the State's Respondent's Brief is somewhat misleading, some
factual clarifications are necessary.
In its statements of facts, the State provides a graphic description of J.W.'s rape,
all the while portraying Mr. Russo as her assailant.

(Resp. Br., pp.1-2.)

Under the

State's version of the "facts," one is left with the abiding impression that it is somehow
beyond cavil that Mr. Russo was J.W.'s rapist.

(See Resp. Br., pp.1-2.)

However,

nothing could be further from the truth. While Mr. Russo readily concedes that J.W. was
the victim of a horrible crime, and he is mindful of the jury's verdict in this case, he
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contends that there is scant evidence that he was the actual perpetrator. First, J.W. did
not identify Mr. Russo as her attacker-either in a photo lineup or by listening to an
audio recording of his voice. (See 8/2/10 Tr., p.238, LsA-15; 8/3/10 Tr., p.551, L.21 p.553, L.16, p.57, L.22 - p.58, L.6, p.60, Ls.1-10.)

While J.W.'s inability to identify

Mr. Russo as her attacker in a photograph is not overly probative, given that the rapist
wore a mask,1 her inability to identify Mr. Russo in an audio recording is highly
probative, given that J.W.'s rapist spoke to her repeatedly during his commission of the
attack. (See, e.g., 8/2/10 Tr., p.210, Ls.8-12, p.212, Ls.2-4, p.215, L.22 - p.216, L.6,
p.219, Ls.2-4, p.220, Ls.1-5.) Second, despite the State's efforts, no forensic evidence
linking Mr. Russo to the crime was ever located.

(See Tr., p.417, L.1 - p.418, L.3,

p.419, L.16 - p.420, L.3 (Rylene Nowlin, an Idaho State Police forensic scientist,
testifying that DNA from saliva found on J.W.'s person, and from semen found on her
floor, matched other men besides Mr. Russo, and that penile swabs of Mr. Russo and
swabs of latex gloves found in Mr. Russo's possession did not evidence any contact
with J.W.).) Third, the State's most crucial piece of evidence-the video of Mr. Russo
having vaginal intercourse with an unidentified female found on his cell phone (see

R., p.121 (prosecutor stating "[t]he video is the strongest piece of evidence that links the
Defendant to the crime. Its exclusion most likely would result in the State dismissing
criminal charges against the Defendant"); 11/30/10 Tr., p.94, LS.8-10 (district court

1 It is, however, somewhat probative given that the assailant apparently knew J.W., as
he told her during the rape that he had been waiting two years to rape her. (See 8/2/10
Tr., p.219, Ls.2-4 (J.W. testifying that her attacker stated, "[t]his is for two-and-a-half
years ago. You wouldn't give me the time of day"); 8/4/10 Tr., p.60, Ls.11-19 (Detective
Weeks testifying that the rapist's statement suggested he was a prior acquaintance of
J.W.).)

2

commenting at sentencing that "you [Mr. Russo] really failed by taking the [video],
because, largely, without that, there wouldn't have been a conviction"))-is not
particularly compelling because, although J.W. and her gynecologist both identified J.W.
as the female in the video (see 8/2/10 Tr., p.226, Ls.5-19; 8/4/10 Tr., p.92, L.2 - p.94,
L.10), the accuracy of their testimony is highly questionable. (Compare Exs. 4, 5 & 6
(photos of J.W.'s pubic area, depicting an average-looking shaved female pubic area
that is notable to the layman based on two c-section scars, a distinctive mole and, a
tattoo on the side of the abdomen) and 8/4/10 Tr., p.86, L.14 - p.91, L.1 (J.W.'s
gynecologist, Dr. Lisa Minge, describing J.W.'s pubic area as being notable insofar as
J.W. lacks pubic hair, "has a markedly defined prepuce," or clitoral hood, has a
distinctive permanent skin crease, has two C-section scars, has a mole off to the side of
the scars, "has a significant tattoo on her lower abdomen," and has a belly button ring,
and pointing these features out on Exhibits 4, 5, and 6), with Ex. 49 (cell phone video
depicting a woman with a shaved pubic area and perhaps a c-section scar or a skin
crease, but seeming to lack a navel piercing, a tattoo, and a distinctive mole).) Finally,
although he was interrogated at some length by the police, Mr. Russo never made any
admissions with regard to the rape of J.W. See Ex. 59. 2
Elsewhere in its Respondent's Brief, the State makes a number of other
misleading statements of fact which bear correction or clarification.

However, the

clarification/correction of these statements are addressed infra, in conjunction with the
specific arguments to which they pertain.

2

Exhibit 59 is a redacted video of Mr. Russo's interrogation.
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone?

2.

Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence
concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone

A.

Introduction
Mr. Russo contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress, under the

Fourth Amendment, the fruits of the State's search of his person, and then his cell
phone. In presenting this argument in his Appellant's Brief, he first explained why the
warrant authorizing a search of his home and motorcycle did not allow the police to
search him, or the phone found on his person, while he was outside of his residence
(App. Br., pp.14-16); he then rebutted one of the arguments alluded to by the State
below, i.e., that the search of the phone was permissible as part of a TerrY frisk for
weapons (App. Br., pp.16-20); and, finally, he debunked the State's primary argument,
which was ultimately adopted by the district court, that police discovery of the contents
of his phone was inevitable such that the exclusionary rule should not be applied even if
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated (App. Br., pp.20-23).
In response, the State argues two of the three points discussed in Mr. Russo's
Appellant's Brief, and it also presents a brand new argument, raised for the first time on
appeal. The State argues first that, even though Mr. Russo was outside his residence
when contacted by the police, the search of his person-and the phone found on his
person-was nevertheless within the scope of the warrant authorizing a search of
residence and his motorcycle. (Resp. Br., pp.8-10.) Second, the State argues for the

3

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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first time on appeal that the search of Mr. Russo's person and, later, his phone, was a
search incident to arrest. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) Finally, the State argues that, even if
the search of Mr. Russo and his phone was violative of the Fourth Amendment, the
exclusionary rule ought not to apply because the evidence on that phone would have
inevitably been discovered through lawful means. 4 (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)
For the reasons set forth in detail below, none of the State's arguments can
salvage the district court's erroneous denial of Mr. Russo's suppression motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
As the State does not dispute that the standard of review set forth in Mr. Russo's

Appellant's Brief (p.13) is the applicable standard of review, no further discussion of the
standard of review is required herein.

C.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video
1.

Under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), Even If Mr. Russo Was
Properly Detained While Officers Obtained And Executed A Search
Warrant For His Residence, He Could Not Be Searched Pursuant To That
Warrant

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo acknowledged that he could be detained while
officers executed a search warrant on his house, but argued that in Michigan v.

Although the State presented an "inevitable discovery" argument below, the "inevitable
discovery" argument presented on appeal is fundamentally different from that which was
presented below. In the district court, the State argued that discovery of the cell phone
video was "inevitable" because, were it not for the illegal search, the State would have
procured (and, in fact, did procure) a second warrant which would have allowed officers
to search Mr. Russo's phone. (R., p.119.) On appeal, the State takes a very different
approach, arguing that, regardless of the illegal search of Mr. Russo's person and
phone, he inevitably would have been arrested and searched incident to arrest.
(Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)
4
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Summers the United States Supreme Court made it clear that a suspect contacted

outside the residence cannot be searched pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of
the residence itself. (App. Br., pp.15-16 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 694).)
The State responds by arguing that a search warrant authorizing a search of a
residence also necessarily authorizes the search of all persons found outside, but
apparently in close proximity to, the residence.

(Resp. Br., pp.8-10.) This argument

turns on a tortured reading of the applicable authorities.

The State reasons that

because one Idaho Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296 (Ct. App.
2002), used the word "premises" broadly in describing the property surrounding the
residence named in a search warrant, we cannot know what the United States Supreme
Court meant when, in Summers, it ruled that a search warrant cannot be used to "justify
the initial detention of [the defendant] outside the premises described in the warrant."
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) The State's argument is meritless.
In Pierce, the warrant authorized a search of what was apparently a rural
property, as it specifically authorized searches of the home, barn, stables, and vehicles
on that property.

Pierce, 137 Idaho at 297.

Thus, it made sense for the Court of

Appeals to describe the property loosely as "the premises." In contrast, in Summers,
the Supreme Court was obviously being more precise in describing "the premises" as
the residence to be searched.

There, the Court observed that the defendant was

contacted on the outside front steps of his residence.

Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.

Based on this fact, the Court concluded that the defendant was "outside the premises
described in the warrant." Id. at 694.
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In this case, we know that the search warrant particularly described Mr. Russo's
residence and his motorcycle (see R, p.134), and that Mr. Russo was undoubtedly
accosted by the police outside of his residence (see R, p.139). Accordingly, the search
warrant in this case is analogous to that which was at issue in Summers and, just as in
Summers, the defendant was initially detained "outside the premises described in the
warrant."

Summers, 452 U.S. at 695.

Thus, as the Supreme Court observed in

Summers, the seizure and subsequent search of the defendant cannot now be justified

as being implicitly authorized under the search warrant for the premises. Id.

2.

Even If Mr. Russo Was Validly Detained, Under The Standards Set Forth
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), There Was No Basis To Search Him
For Weapons And, Even If There Was, The Officers' Search Of
Mr. Russo's Phone Far Exceeded What Was Permissible Under Terry

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo addressed an argument alluded to by the
State below, explaining why his detention and search, and the search of his phone,
were not permissible as "weapons frisk" under Terry v. Ohio. (App. Br., pp.16-20.) In
its Respondent's Brief, the State fails to address this argument, apparently abandoning
all attempts to justify the search in this case under Terry.

Because the State has

waived any argument under Terry, see State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... ");

I.A.R 35(b)(6),5 no further discussion of this issue is warranted herein.

5 Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party" who fails to
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, (emphasis added). This
broader language makes sense, of course, since the holding of Zichko was based on
the appellant's failure to comply with I.A.R 35, which requires not only that the
appellant's brief "contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied upon,"
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3.

The Search Of Mr. Russo's Person, And The Cell Phone Found On His
Person, Cannot Be Justified As A Search Incident To Arrest

Having abandoned the Terry exception to the warrant requirement, which was
one the arguments apparently attempted to have been advanced below (see
R., pp.111-14), the State now attempts to justify the search of Mr. Russo's person, and

the cell phone found on his person, under a different exception to the warrant
requirement-the search incident to arrest exception. Mr. Russo submits, however, that
this new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is unavailing.
Preliminarily, it is important to note that, especially in the context of the Fourth
Amendment (because it is the State that bears the burden of proving that a given
warrantless search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,290 (1995)), the State is not free to raise
new arguments for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho

509, 515 n.4 (2010) (identifying the rule that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider
issues not raised in the court below," and suggesting that that rule generally applies to
the State when it is the respondent on appeal, just as it does to the defendantappellant); State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 81-82 (2000) (rejecting the State's attempt to
argue for the first time on a appeal that the defendant lacked "standing" to challenge the
search of his wife's purse); State v. Reimer, 127 Idaho 214,218-19 (1995) (rejecting the
State's attempt to argue for the first time on appeal that the search of a mug was
permissible under the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement). See also

I.A.R. 35(a)(6), but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.A.R. 35(b)(6).
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has defaulted the State, as the respondent, when it has
failed to comply with the requirements of I.A.R. 35(b)(6). See e.g., State v. Ruiz, 150
Idaho 469,471 (2010) (declining to address the question of whether an error found was
harmless because the State failed to present argument on this point).
9

Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56,57 (2006) ("Appellate court review is
'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented . . . below.'
Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time
on appeaL") (citations omitted). Cf United States v. Jones, _

U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 945,

954 (2012) (rejecting the government's attempt to argue for the first time in the Supreme
Court that placing a tracking device on a vehicle was lawful because the officers
possessed probable cause to believe that the defendant was "a leader in a large-scale
cocaine distribution conspiracy"; finding that because this argument was not addressed
below and, therefore, not addressed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, it was
forfeited).
To the extent, however, that this Court is willing to indulge the State's new
argument, it should reject it.

The State's argument is essentially as follows:

(1)

although the police had absolutely no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest (as
they repeatedly described their detention of him as an "investigative detention," explicitly
told him that he was not under arrest, and explained that they searched him as part of a
weapons frisk), this Court should retrospectively characterize the encounter as an arrest
and a search incident to arrest; (2) in characterizing this encounter as an arrest and a
search incident to arrest, this Court should ignore the fact that Mr. Russo was arrested
primarily because of the fruits of the supposed "search incident to arrest," not based on
the evidence which caused the officers to seek a search warrant for Mr. Russo's home
and motorcycle; (3) this Court should find that, if there is probable cause for issuance of
a search warrant for a home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of
that home; and (4) because Mr. Russo has not challenged on appeal the magistrate's
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issuance of a search warrant, it is now "undisputed" that probable cause to search and,
therefore, to arrest, existed. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) This entire argument is premised on
the assertion that the United States Supreme Court has held that a search incident to
arrest may "precede[ ] a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a suspect
exists at the time of the search." (Resp. Br., p.11 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 111 (1980).)
The flaws in the State's argument are legion.

First and foremost, the State's

argument is premised upon a somewhat misleading representation of United States
Supreme Court precedent. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court certainly held
that a search incident to arrest may precede formal arrest where probable cause to
arrest exists at the time of the search, Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111; however, the State
fails to mention that this is true only "[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the
heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person," id., and where the fruits of that
search do not serve as "part of" the justification for the arrest, Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S.
541, 543 (1990) (quoting Sib ron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968)); see also
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111 n.6. See State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351 (Ct. App.

2008) ("So long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and the
fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest, the
search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that arrest.").
In this case, the officers had no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest
initially; they only intended to detain him.

It was only because the phone was

discovered and searched, and potentially incriminating evidence was found on that

11

phone, that Mr. Russo was actually arrested.

Detective Cain, one of the two officers

who detained Mr. Russo, described the incident in her report as follows:
Cpl. Weekes stated that if he stepped outside if his residence again, he
needed to be detained . . .. Mike exited his residence . . .. I detained
Mike with my handcuffs and told him he was being detained. He asked if
he was being arrested ofr] detained.
I told him it was called an
investigatory detention at this time. I then searched Mike to make sure he
didn't have anything sharp on him. He had a wallet in his right back
pocket and a cell phone in his front right pocket. . .. I held onto Mike's
wallet and cell phone until I turned them over to Detective King when he
arrived on scene approximately 5 minutes after I detained him.
(R., p.142 (emphasis added).)

Detective King then searched the phone.

(See

R., p.104; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.21 - p.71, L.2.) The report of Detective Palfreyman is
consistent with that of Detective Cain:
Det. Cain advised me that she had been given the instructions that if the
suspect, Russo, came out of the residence again ... that we were to
detain him for questioning . ....
At approximately 1150 hours Det. Cain advised me that she saw the
suspect leave the residence and head towards the mailboxes ....
Det. Cain and I then made contact with Russo at the mailbox area. He
was detained and placed into handcuffs. Det. Cain then searched him for
any weapons. We did not locate any weapons on him.6

(R., p.139 (emphasis added).) Further, a subsequent affidavit submitted in support of a
request for a warrant authorizing a search of the phone, which by then had already
been searched by Det. King, described the incident as follows:
[A] cellular phone was recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat
down search for officer safety. This phone was opened and looked at to
determine ownership. Your affiant knows that a video was located on that
phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's rape. At that
point the review of the cell phone's contents was stopped .... Your affiant
requests permission to search the entirety of the phone.
6 Det. Palfreyman's report makes no mention of the phone found in Det. Cain's search
of Mr. Russo's person, or Det. King's search of that phone a few minutes later.
(R., pp.139-40.)
12

(R., p.154.)

Thus, Mr. Russo's arrest would not have followed on the heels of the

search of his person, but for discovery of the video found on the phone found on his
person. 7

Accordingly, rather than presenting an argument that is consistent with

Supreme Court precedent, the State seeks to have this Court turn that precedent on its
head.
A second flaw in the State's position is that it has not, and indeed cannot, support
its contention that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for a
home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. Initially, it
is important to note that the State has offered no legal authority in support of its
argument in this regard. (See Resp. Brief, p.11.) Accordingly, the State has waived this
argument. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.A.R. 35(b)(6).
More importantly though, the State's position is not legally supportable. It cannot
be said that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for a home, ipso

facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. See Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979) (holding that a search warrant authorizing a search of a
tavern and the person of the bartender did not establish probable cause to search
another patron found on the premises); United States v. Oi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585-86
(1948) (holding that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception
does not allow for searches of the individuals riding therein).

Indeed, the inquiry of

whether probable cause exists to conduct a search is not identical to the inquiry of
whether probable cause exists to arrest.

See State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282

The district court noted that the search could not be justified as a search incident to
arrest because the subsequent arrest "was, in part, based on the items obtained at the
search." (1/27/10 Tr., p.82, Ls.4-6.)
7
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(Ct. App. 2005).8 If it were, and if probable cause to search necessarily gave rise to
probable cause to arrest the homeowner (and search that homeowner incident to
arrest), in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court would not have had to engage in
an analysis of whether the homeowner could be temporarily detained while the police
executed a search warrant at his residence; it simply could have held that, because a
magistrate had determined that there was probable cause to believe drugs were in
Summers' home, ipso facto, there was probable cause to arrest him and search him
incident to arrest. But, of course, that was not the holding of Summers; Summers was
far more limited. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05 ("If the evidence that a citizen's
residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an
invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that
citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home.
Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband

8 In Gibson, the Court of Appeals explained as follows:
The standard of probable cause involves the same quantum of
evidence regardless of whether an arrest or a search is involved. United
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004). Nonetheless, the
facts needed to justify a search are different from those needed to justify a
seizure. Humphries, 372 F.3d at 659. Rather, each conclusion requires a
showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances.
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (3d ed.1996). The right to
arrest arises when a crime is committed or attempted in the officer's
presence whereas a search can be authorized when probable cause
demonstrates that an item connected with criminal activity will be found in
a certain location. Id. In the case of an arrest, the conclusion concerns the
guilt of the arrestee. LaFave, supra, at § 3.1 (b). Accordingly, although the
conclusions that justify a search or seizure must be supported by the
same degree of integrity, the conclusions themselves are not identical. Id.
Therefore, the existence of probable cause to search Gibson's vehicle
does not resolve whether there was probable cause to believe that Gibson
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282.
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founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."). And, in Summers, the
Court noted that Summers was arrested (and searched incident to arrest), only after his
home had been searched pursuant to a properly-executed search warrant and that
search yielded additional evidence to support a finding of probable cause to arrest
Summers. See id. at 693 & n.1.
The third flaw in the State's reasoning relates to the question of whether, given
the facts of this case, there was actually probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. The State
claims that "it is undisputed in this case that the officers had, before they detained and
searched him, established probable cause to believe that Russo had committed several
rapes."

(Resp. Br., p.11 (emphasis added).)

As such, the State suggests that

Mr. Russo has implicitly conceded that there was probable cause to believe he
committed one or more rapes. The State's statement, however, is misleading, and its
suggestion is patently false.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo did not challenge the magistrate's finding of
probable cause to search his residence and, therefore, its issuance of the search
warrant.

However, this decision on Mr. Russo's part is in no way a concession that

probable cause-either to search or to arrest-existed. A forfeiture of a claim is far
different than a concession of that claim.

Thus, the fact that Mr. Russo has not

challenged the issuance of the search warrant in no way informs the question of
whether there was probable cause to arrest him.9 A more accurate assertion from the

9 There are any number of reasons why an appellate claim may be forfeited, see, e.g.,
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983) (recognizing that appellate counsel may,
for strategic reasons, properly forego colorable claims on appeal), not the least of which
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State would have been that it has not yet been disputed on appeal that the officers had
probable cause to believe that Mr. Russo was a rapist. And, of course, the reason that
this issue has not yet been disputed on appeal is that the State's current "search
incident to arrest" argument is a brand new one, raised for the first time on appeal.
Mr. Russo simply had no reason to argue that probable cause was lacking prior to now.
Accordingly, the State's suggestion that this appeal can be resolved by reliance on a
single fact-the fact that a warrant was issued for a search of Mr. Russo's residenceshould be rejected.
Rejection of the State's argument in this regard ought to end the inquiry, as the
State has not attempted to argue the facts of the case, or to explain how those facts
give rise to probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.A.R.
35(b )(6).

However, to the extent that this Court is willing to indulge the State's new

"search incident to arrest" argument, and is willing to engage in the probable cause

is that a given claim may be subject to an unfavorable standard of review. Compare
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo
review. A magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference
by reviewing courts.' 'A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants,' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant 'courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by
interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.' ...
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of
an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as the
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.") (Citations omitted),
and State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2004) (applying Gates' "substantial basis"
standard in reviewing the district court's decision to issue a search warrant), with
State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-53 (1989) (reviewing de novo the trial court's
determination that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant).
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analysis that the State skipped, Mr. Russo offers the following explanation of why there
was no probable cause to support an arrest (prior to discovery of the cell phone video).
When police got the call about J.W.'s rape, they immediately suspected
Mr. Russo-not because they had any evidence linking him to the crime, but because
he was their usual suspect.

(See R, pp.131-32.)

Mr. Russo has a Washington

conviction for rape (the rape occurred in 1995). (R., pp.129-30.) In addition, he was a
suspect in a bizarre home invasion in Nampa in August 200S. (See R., pp.127-29.) He
was not charged in that case though. (R, p.7S; see also R, pp.123-32.) Thereafter,
based on his prior conviction and the suspicion that he was involved in the Nampa
home invasion, Mr. Russo was identified as a suspect in a July 2009 rape in Fruitland. 10
(See R, pp.125-27.) However, he had not been charged in that case either. (R, pp.7S79; see also R, pp.123-32.)

The fact is that there was no direct evidence actually

linking Mr. Russo to either the Nampa incident or the Fruitland rape. (See R, pp.12531.)

Furthermore, the victim of the Nampa incident was shown at least three photo

lineups and one video lineup which included Mr. Russo, but she never identified him as
her attacker (R, p.7S), and bystanders who saw the apparent assailant leaving the
scene of the Nampa incident indicated that Mr. Russo was not the man they saw
(R, pp.7S, 12S).
The only new evidence that the police had when J.W. reported her rape in this
case was that, when the police went to the home of their usual suspect in the early
morning hours of August 29, 2009, the engine of his motorcycle was "extremely hot,"

10 While the Fruitland rape bore a couple of similarities (as well as a large number of
dissimilarities) to the rape Mr. Russo committed in Washington in 1995, the Nampa
incident bore no similarities. (R., pp.12S-32.)
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indicating that it had recently been ridden, and the lights were on in Mr. Russo's
residence, indicating that Mr. Russo was awake early that morning. 11 (R., pp.131-32.)
Mr. Russo submits that merely being the usual suspect, and having apparently been out
and about on the morning after the rape-with no evidence actually connecting him to
J.W., her residence (or even her city),12 or the crime-does not constitute probable
cause to arrest.

13

See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (discussing the

probable cause standard).

A hunch?

Definitely.

Reasonable articulable suspicion?

Perhaps. But probable cause? Most certainly not. 14
4.

Because The "Inevitable Discovery" Doctrine Has No Application In This
Case, The Exclusionary Rule Applies And The District Court Erred In
Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo argued that the so-called "inevitable discovery"
doctrine has no application in this case.

(App. Br., pp.20-23.)

In presenting this

11 In its Respondent's Brief, the State suggests that the police had an additional piece of
evidence connecting Mr. Russo to the rape of J.W. It asserts that "[s]tarting around
6:00 [on the morning of J.W.'s rape] officers saw Russo making several trips to a
laundry room near his four-plex apartment where he started doing laundry, including
clothing matching the description provided by the victim of clothing worn by the rapist."
(Resp. Br., p.5; see also Resp. Br., p.13.) This suggestion is exceptionally misleading.
The record reveals only that, before they obtained a warrant to search Mr. Russo's
residence, officers saw him leave that residence and walk around his building. There is
no indication that the officers knew he was going to/from a laundry room, and there is
certainly no indication that the officers saw him carrying clothes fitting the description
provided by J.W. (See R., pp.145, 153-54 (application for amended search warrant,
indicating that it was only later that officers learned of the existence of the laundry room,
and seeking permission an amended warrant that would allow a search of that laundry
room).
12 The rape was committed in Nampa, but Mr. Russo lived in Meridian.
13 Had the evidence concerning the other alleged crimes been sufficient to give rise to
probable cause, presumably Mr. Russo would have been arrested and charged for
those crimes.
14 Mr. Russo's contention that probable cause to arrest did not exist prior to discovery of
the cell phone video is supported by the State's candid concession below that, without
the video, it probably could not even take Mr. Russo's case to trial. (R., p.121.)
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argument, he explained why the State's theory of inevitable discovery-its contention
that, but for the illegality, the State would have sought, and received, a second or
amended warrant that would have authorized seizure and search of Mr. Russo's
phone-is unavailing. (App. Sr., p.22.) He also explained why the district court's theory
of inevitable discovery-its belief that the original warrant authorized a search of
Mr. Russo's person, and his phone, even though he was found outside the residencewas incorrect. (App. Sr., p.23.)
On appeal, the State again argues the inevitable discovery doctrine, but it does
so based on a wholly new theory. This time around, the State places no reliance on the
search warrants; instead, it claims that, even if the original search of Mr. Russo and his
phone was improper, because it was inevitable that he would have been arrested at
some point, it is likewise inevitable that his phone would have been seized and
searched. (Resp. Sr., pp.12-13.) However, the reality is that the police did not have
probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo when they first arrived, and they did not discover
sufficient new evidence to give rise to probable cause to arrest him after they searched
his home and motorcycle.

As noted above, all police knew when they arrived at

Mr. Russo's residence was that he was their usual suspect, and that he had been out
and about on his motorcycle early that morning. 15 Furthermore, when they executed
their warrants, they found only two items of interest-neither of which is particularly

15 The State claims that the evidence showed that "Russo had driven his motorcycle a
considerable distance before 5:47 a.m. the morning of the rape" (Resp. Sr., p.13);
however, this is fanciful speculation by the State. The evidence showed simply that the
motorcycle's engine was "extremely hot." (R., p.132.) There is no evidence in record
showing how hot "extremely hot" is, and there is certainly no expert testimony in the
record equating any particular motorcycle engine temperature with any particular
distance driven.
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probative. First, the officers found in the laundry room clothing supposedly matching
that which was worn by J.W.'s assailant. 16 However, the clothing found was far from a
perfect match to that which was described by J.W. Immediately after she was raped,
J.W. called 9-1-1 and reported that her attacker had been wearing jean shorts (see
8/3/10 Tr., p.281, L.23 - p.282, L.1; Ex.1), but the clothes found in Mr. Russo's laundry
room included full-length jeans, not jean shorts (8/3/10 Tr., p.387, Ls.1-13).17 Second,
although the police found latex gloves in the saddlebags on Mr. Russo's motorcycle
(R., p.135)-latex gloves which the State now claims were "similar to those used by the
rapist" (Resp. Br., p.13)-the fact is that the State has offered no evidence to suggest
that those latex gloves fit any sort of specific description provided by J.W. (See Ex. 1
(9-1-1 call indicating that the rapist used "medical" gloves, but failing to otherwise

16 Officers also found in Mr. Russo's residence a pair of boots which, at trial, it
attempted to link to a tread print left on J.W.'s balcony. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.371, L.20p.372, L.12; Ex. 30.) However, despite what the officers may now claim, the possible
match of the Mr. Russo's to the marks on the balcony would not have been immediately
apparent and, thus, Mr. Russo's boots would not have necessarily implicated him.
Indeed, even after thorough study, the State's expert was never able to link Mr. Russo's
specific boots to the marks on the balcony. (8/3/10 Tr., p.4l0, L.19 - p.480, L.10.) In
fact, she conceded that the boots found in Mr. Russo's residence are common, as they
are available at the Gowen Field Base Exchange, and a lot soldiers deploying out of
Gowen Field are wearing them. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.474, L.20 - p.475, L.11.) In addition,
the type of outsole in question, the "Sierra" produced by Vibram, is not only available on
boots like those possessed by Mr. Russo and common among Idaho's soldiers, but is
also used on numerous other brands of shoes or boots, including: Wolverine, Belleville,
Rocky Shoes, Weinbrenner, Danner, Bule, Brown, McRae, Wellco, Altama, STC,
Jengrate, Minor, and Son. (8/3/10 Tr., p.475, L.12 - p.476, L.14.)
17 The evidence discussed in this portion of Mr. Russo's Reply Brief was not before the
district court when the suppression motion was decided. However, because the State
never argued inevitable discovery based on an inevitable search incident to arrest
below and Mr. Russo, therefore, was deprived of an opportunity below to show why that
argument fails, fundamental fairness, i.e., due process, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, demands that he be allowed to go outside the evidence that
was before the district court at the suppression hearing.

20

describe them).)

Mr. Russo contends that clothing different from that which was

described by the victim, and latex gloves that were not shown to be similar to those
used in the rape, were not probative of his guilt and, therefore, even when coupled with
the officers' hunch (arising out of the fact that Mr. Russo was their usual suspect and
had obviously driven his motorcycle early that morning), did not give them probable
cause to arrest Mr. Russo. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71. Further, even if this Court
could, in hindsight, say that probable cause existed, that does not mean that Mr. Russo
would have inevitably been arrested at that time.

As noted above, the State has

recognized that without the video, it does not have a case against Mr. Russo (see

R., p.121), so it is reasonable to infer that without the video, the State never would have
had sufficient confidence in its case to arrest Mr. Russo.

II.
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly Prejudicial
Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual Interests
Mr. Russo contends that the district court erred in allowing the State to present
evidence that he had sexual fantasies involving rape, and that he possessed
pornography depicting simulated rape.

(App. Sr., pp.23-29.)

He argues that such

evidence was relevant only to his character and/or his sexual deviancy and, therefore,
was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (App. Sr., pp.26-27.) Alternatively, he asserts
that, even if fantasy/pornography evidence was relevant to some proper purpose (such
as motive, intent, plan, etc.), it was so prejudicial that the prejudice substantially
outweighed its marginal probative value. (App. Sr., pp.27-29.)
In

response,

the

State

offers

two

reasons

why

fantasy/pornography evidence is relevant to a proper purpose.
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it

believes

the

First, it argues that,

under State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009), the evidence was relevant to
prove intent, motive, and a plan. (See Resp. Br., p.16.) Second, based on Rossignol
and two out-of-state cases (State v. Brown, 710 S.E.2d 265 (N.C. App. 2011), and
People v. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d 463 (III. App. 4th Dist. 2010», the State contends that the
fantasy/pornography evidence is relevant to show "intent and motive and, by extension,
identity." (Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) In the alternative, the State also asserts that, to the
extent that admission of the fantasy/pornography evidence was error, that error was
harmless. (Resp. Br., p.19 nA.)
None of the State's arguments have merit.

Initially, with regard to the State's

reliance on Rossignol and its contention that the fantasy/pornography evidence
demonstrates intent, motive, or plan, little response is necessary.

This issue was

squarely addressed (and thoroughly refuted) in Mr. Russo's opening brief. (See App.

Br., p.26.)
The State's "identity" argument, however, does deserve a brief discussion.
making its "identity" argument, the State reasons as follows:
Someone who views depictions of rape for entertainment and
titillation and who fantasizes about committing rape is more likely to be a
rapist than someone who finds those acts repulsive. Given the narrow
scope of the evidence (limited to evidence concerning fantasies of sexual
violence against women and pornography depicting vaginal and oral rape)
and how that evidence matched the facts of this case, the evidence
established motive, intent, and identity.

[S]omeone who fantasizes and seeks entertainment from
depictions of rape is more likely to gain (by 'sating his sexual urges') by
committing a rape than someone who at no time contemplates such an act
and would gain no such satisfaction from it. Indeed, whoever committed
the rape generally 'emulated' the 'acts and scenarios' contained in
Russo's fantasies and entertainment. ...
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In

· . .. That Russo spent time fantasizing about rape and seeking
depictions of it for entertainment demonstrates that his more likely the
rapist.
(Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) Essentially, the State's argument is that if Mr. Russo is the kind
of sexual deviant who is aroused by the idea of rape, chances are good that he acted in
conformity with his sexual deviancy in this case. In other words, the State is arguing
propensity and character-the very thing that Rule 404(b) prohibits.
Finally, the State offers an alternative claim that, even if the fantasy/pornography
evidence was improperly admitted, its admission was harmless. (Resp. Br., p.19 n.4.)
However, the sum total of the State's contention in this regard is as follows: "The state
also asserts that the claimed error is necessarily harmless given the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, which included evidence that Russo had the video of the rape on his
cell phone. I.C.R. 52; State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183
(2007)." (Resp. Br., p.19 n.4.) There are multiple flaws with this claim though. First,
because the State has failed to support its contention with any real argument, it ought
not to be considered by this Court. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.A.R. 35(b)(6); see also
Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471 (declining to address the question of whether an error found was

harmless because the State failed to present argument on this point).
Second, in evaluating the question of whether an error is harmless, the question
is not whether the remainder of the State's evidence is "overwhelming," as the State
suggests.

The applicable standard is that which was articulated in Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)-whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227
(2010) (making it clear that evidentiary errors, not just constitutional errors, are subject
to the Chapman harmless error test). And, under this standard, "[t]he inquiry ... is not
23

whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). In this
case, it cannot be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict was not
attributable to the highly prejudicial, extraordinarily inflammatory fact that Mr. Russo has
had rape fantasies and has possessed pornography depicting simulations of rape.
Third, even if the standard for judging harmlessness was an "overwhelming
evidence" test, the fact is that the evidence in this case is not overwhelming. As the
State has indicated, the critical piece of evidence-the evidence without which the State
concedes it could not even have proceeded to trial-is the video found on Mr. Russo's
phone. (See R., p.121.) However, as is discussed in the foregoing Statement of Facts,
it is far from certain that the female in the video is actually the victim in this case, J.W.
In this case, the jury, based on its review of the video, and its comparison of that video
to the images of J.W.'s pubic area, could have easily entertained a reasonable doubt
that the female in the video was, in fact, J.W., but been persuaded that Mr. Russo was
guilty because of the State's evidence of his deviant sexual interests.

24

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court orders denying
suppression of the cell phone video and admitting evidence of his sexual fantasies and
pornography; that it vacate his convictions and sentences; and that it remand his case
for a new trial.
DATED this 25 th day of September, 2012.

Chief, Appellate Unit
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